On June 29, 2026, Open Net was invited to speak at a closed-door webinar with the officials of National Communication Commission of Taiwan on the state sponsored content moderation practices.

	出席人員 Participants
OpenNet	Kyung Sin Park 執行長
國家通訊傳播委員會 National Communications Commission Internet Communication Office	葉宸熙專員 David Yeh, Senior Specialist 劉楚慧專員 Chu Hui Lui, Senior Specialist 林盈均專員 Yin Chun Lin, Senior Specialist 李岢庭專員 Ke Ting Lee, Senior Specialist 鄭倍鈞科員 Pei Chun Cheng, specialist 林園婷科員 Yuan Ting Lin, specialist 王婷科員 Ting Wang, Specialist 林昶佑科員 Chang-Yu Lin, Specialist
台北市電腦商業同業公會 Taipei Computer Center Industry Policy & Law Center	劉昱均總監 Yu-Jun Liu, Director 黃皓羽專案經理 Harvey Huang, Project Manager 林昱廷高級專員 Yu-Ting Lin, Senior Specialist 黃律維高級專員 Lu-Wei Huang, Senior Specialist   張光耀高級專員 Albert Chang, Senior Specialist 江岱臻專員 Minerva Chiang, Specialist 林思雯專員 Claire Lin, Specialist 鄭翕宸專員 Shi-Chen Cheng, Specialist

The seminar is a continuation of a research conducted by NCC in the direction represented in the following excerpt of the research:

With the increasing penetration of the internet, Taiwan—being a highly digitalized society—has witnessed the deep integration of online services into the daily lives of the vast majority of its citizens. However, this ubiquity has also given rise to malicious uses of digital platforms, drawing growing attention to the issue of internet governance. Traditional top-down administrative approaches have proven inadequate in the online context. Due to the decentralized and real-time nature of the internet, digital platforms—unlike traditional media—lack a singular content control authority. Consequently, it is not feasible to uniformly correct or remove content through centralized commands. Moreover, the volume and immediacy of user-generated content pose significant challenges for platform operators in terms of pre-moderation or comprehensive oversight. Overregulation may also hinder the free flow of information, disrupt users' daily experiences, and provoke public backlash. Therefore, internet governance must strike a careful balance among the rights and interests of multiple stakeholders, while also navigating the tension between public interest and freedom of expression.

In 2022, the National Communications Commission (NCC) of Taiwan introduced a draft bill for the "Digital Intermediary Services Act," aiming to systematically regulate the responsibilities of digital intermediaries and to establish a dedicated agency to serve as a liaison between intermediary service providers and various competent authorities. However, the draft bill sparked widespread public debate, and a broad social consensus has yet to be reached. In the meantime, Taiwan has adopted a fragmented approach, wherein each competent authority governs according to its respective mandates through administrative measures and specific legislation—covering areas such as child protection, fraud prevention, and the prevention of non-consensual dissemination of intimate imagery. Nonetheless, this decentralized governance model faces several persistent challenges: balancing internet governance with freedom of speech; preventing inconsistencies in administrative enforcement standards; enhancing the effectiveness of policy communication; and improving inter-agency coordination under a fragmented legislative framework. These challenges highlight the limitations of the current system in integrating resources and ensuring coherence.

This research examines the internet governance frameworks of the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, the European Union (with a focus on Germany, France, and Estonia), Japan, South Korea, and Singapore. [omitted] 

Since the passage of the Digital Services Act (DSA) in 2022, the European Union has gradually established a systemic online governance framework centered on risk management and transparency obligations, replacing previous legislation targeting specific types of online content. The DSA came into force across all Member States in 2024, requiring each country to designate a national coordinator and stipulate platform obligations and redress mechanisms. This development prompted countries such as Germany and France to complete the necessary domestic legal alignments and authority designations, reflecting the EU’s broader effort to promote regulatory harmonization and institutional integration. The DSA significantly enhances accountability for large platforms and strengthens cross-border enforcement, offering valuable reference points for Taiwan in future efforts to improve platform transparency and user redress systems.

Amid growing concerns over the proliferation of hate speech and disinformation on social media platforms, Germany has shifted away from a traditionally non-interventionist stance towards increased accountability for platform operators. The Network Enforcement Act (Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz, NetzDG), enacted in 2017, requires large social platforms to promptly remove illegal content such as hate speech, defamation, and extremist materials, and to regularly disclose enforcement statistics. It was among the first laws globally to establish such obligations. To comply with the EU's DSA, which became fully applicable in February 2024, Germany enacted its national implementation law, the Digital Services Act Implementation Act (Digitale-Dienste-Gesetz, DDG), which came into effect on May 14, 2024. In aligning with the DSA’s harmonized regulatory framework, the DDG includes sunset clauses that repeal portions of the NetzDG, signaling a legal transition toward EU-level integration.

France, in response to evolving online governance demands and to align with the DSA, enacted and amended multiple laws, including Law No. 2004-575 on Confidence in the Digital Economy, Law No. 2016-1321 on the Digital Republic, and Law No. 2021-1109 on Reinforcing Respect for the Principles of the Republic. These changes ensured timely national implementation of the DSA. According to online interview feedback, France designated the Regulatory Authority for Audiovisual and Digital Communication (ARCOM) as its Digital Services Coordinator within the prescribed timeframe, while adjusting its enforcement structure in coordination with the National Commission on Informatics and Liberty (CNIL). Distinct from the administrative sanctioning mechanisms adopted in most countries, France applies a judicial oversight model for major enforcement actions. ARCOM may supervise platforms and issue orders or information requests, but the imposition of fines or other coercive measures requires judicial approval. This approach reflects France’s commitment to maintaining a clear separation of powers and ensuring that judicial authorities intervene in decisions involving controversial or high-impact content, contrasting with the administrative enforcement regimes of Germany, the UK, and Australia. In those jurisdictions, designated regulators (e.g., Bundesnetzagentur in Germany, Ofcom in the UK, and eSafety in Australia) are empowered to directly order removals or impose fines without prior judicial authorization. France’s framework underscores its emphasis on freedom of expression and procedural safeguards, aiming for a balanced model between liberty and enforcement efficacy. [omitted]

In continuation, the seminar discussed the following specific questions:

1. Article 44-7, Paragraph 2 of the Information and Communications Network Act: No person who knows that information falls under any of the following categories shall distribute, through an information and communications network, information that infringes upon another person’s personality rights, property rights, or the public interest, for the purpose of causing harm or obtaining improper benefits. Such information is referred to as “false or manipulated information.” However, satire and parody are excluded. Information whose content is false in whole or in part is referred to as “false information.” Information that has been altered in a way that causes its content to be mistaken as factual is referred to as “manipulated information.” Regarding the determination of what constitutes “partially false” information, how should this be assessed in concrete terms? Sometimes a message may contain errors that are immaterial to its main point. For example, if some data in the message differs from the actual figures, would that also constitute “partially false” information?
2. Although this amendment takes into account freedom of expression and the public interest, and includes an anti-SLAPP design under Article 44-11, comparative legislative examples such as anti-discrimination laws in Europe and the United States show that even where opportunities for defense exist, the mere possibility that speech may easily become subject to litigation can, in substance, produce a chilling effect. Are there any supporting measures to address this concern?
3. South Korea’s efforts and technological infrastructure for combating non-consensual intimate imagery appear to be stronger than those of many other countries. We would like to know how actual protection is carried out in South Korea with regard to the storage, training, and handling of relevant images. Has anyone challenged these practices?
4. The Korea Communications Standards Commission’s responsibilities involve balancing content regulation and restrictions on freedom of expression. We would like to understand KCSC’s status as an independent agency in South Korea, how its public credibility is maintained, and how civil society views it.